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COMMENTARY
"CHILLING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE"
THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE
STANLEY MOSK*

III blows the wind that profits nobody. **
The recent winds have indeed profited the Supreme Court of
California. The Ayatollah Khomeini, the Russian invasion of Af
ghanistan, and Woodward and Armstrong! have driven us off the
front pages. The court, however, shall return to national attention
in the near future. 2
The Supreme Court of California was catapulted into the na
tion's headlines after allegations surfaced that justices may have
manipulated the electoral system for their own political gain. Dur
ing the 1978 campaign, and particularly on election eve, unfavor
able newspaper articles appeared alleging that politically sensitive
cases 3 were held up, not to be filed until after the election at
* Associate Justice, California Supreme Court. This article is adapted from a lec
ture given during the Administrative Law Judges' Symposium, February 15, 1980, in
Washington, D.C.
** SHAKESPEARE, Henry VI, Part 3, IIv.
1. R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979).
2. See text accompanying notes 29-33 infra.
3. Particularly significant is the opinion in People v. Tanner, 23 Cal. 3d 16, 587
P.2d 1112, 151 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1978) (en bane), in which a majority of the supreme
court affirmed a trial judge's decision to grant probation, notwithstanding a statute
mandating that probation not be granted to persons using firearms during specified
crimes. Chief Justice Bird concurred on the ground that the statute was un
1

2

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

which Chief Justice Rose Bird was a candidate for retention. 4 In
response, the Chief Justice unilaterally took the unprecedented
step of requesting "an impartial and complete investigation by the
Commission on Judicial Performance."5
The Commission, never before cast into the limelight, re
sponded with enthusiasm and, through appropriate channels, had
its rules changed to provide for public investigative hearings. 6
Thus, television and radio coverage were welcomed. Such open
proceedings, prior to actual disciplinary recommendations to the
supreme court itself, were clearly contrary to state constitutional
requirements of confidentiality.7 Reason and restraint, however,
were swept aside by fear and emotion.
The Commission, in conducting the investigation, discarded
traditional safeguards in favor of unrestrained attempts to gather
relevant and even irrelevant information. For example, the Com
mission declared itself not bound by rules of evidence. 8 Thus, it
permitted reports on corridor gossip among law clerks, inquiries
constitutional. Public dissatisfaction with the decision, indicated by several strong dis
sents, was ended after the decision was vacated in People v. Tanner, 24 Cal. 3d 514,
596 P.2d 32B, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979).
The timing of the Tanner decision, rather than the controversial holding, precipi
tated the accusations leveled against the California Supreme Court. On November 7,
197B, on the day of the retention election, stories circulated that the court had de
layed the Tanner decision to prevent adverse reaction against Chief Justice Bird and
three other justices. These reports asserted that the decision had not been announced
despite the fact "that individual decisions were signed some time ago by all members
of the court." See generally Greenburg, judicial Misadventures in California: A Re
sponse to Professor Tribe, 65 ABA J. 1493, 1494 (1979).
4. Chief Justice Bird won retention by 51.7% of the vote, the narrowest margin
for a judge in the state's history. See Tribe, Trying California's judges on Television:
Open Government or judicial Intimidation?, 65 ABA J. 1175, 1176 (1979).
5. See Greenburg, supra note 3, at 1494.
6. See Tribe, supra note 4, at 1177. See also Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d
474,499,601 P.2d 1030, 104B, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494,512 (1979) (en bane), in which a spe
cial California Supreme Court held that new rule 902.5 of the California Rules of
Court, authorizing a public investigation by the Commission, was unconstitutional in
light of CAL. CaNST. art. VI, § IB, sub. (f).
7. CAL. CaNST. art. VI, § 1B, sub. (f) states: "The Judicial Council shall make
rules implementing this section and providing for confidentiality of proceedings." In
Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979) (en
bane), the court concluded that a strong policy in favor of confidentiality and the ab
sence of intent to change the former constitutional requirement of confidentiality,
CAL. CaNST., art. VI, § lOb, ~ 3, precluded the Judicial Council from authorizing
public investigations before the Commission. Id. at 499, 601 P.2d at 104B, 159
Cal. Rptr. at 512.
B. California Judicial Conduct Commission Resolution to amend the rules of evi
dence, adopted April 20, 1979, and introduced in the proceedings as Exhibit 660.
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into intent, motivation, and speculation, and it welcomed the
rankest type of hearsay as well as multiple hearsay evidence. 9
In addition, the investigation broadened to irrelevant dis
cussions of internal matters. Justices were called upon to discuss
why their secretaries did not receive carpeting and why one justice
would not speak to another justice unless a law clerk was present to
take notes. Staff members were asked about conversations with
newspaper reporters. Law clerks were grilled on why a particular
footnote was inserted into an opinion. Justices were cross-examined
as to why specific citations were included in their writings. Finally,
every draft of an opinion, every intra-office memorandum, and all
court records of an internal nature relating to a number of
specific cases were subpoenaed and offered in evidence in public
proceedings.
I had warned the Commission and its counsel several times
that they were violating our state constitutional requirement of
confidentiality,10 but they chose to continue their investigation in
public. I found the investigation so bizarre that my conscience dic
tated I compel compliance with the state constitution by means of
a lawsuit. l l My colleagues, though agreeing generally with my po
sition, did not see fit to take similar action. Through a convoluted
series of court proceedings 12 I was able to obtain the unanimous
judgment of eleven appellate court justices that indeed the state
constitution meant precisely what it said. 13 Therefore, the Judicial
Council did not have the power to authorize public investigations
9. For example, a law clerk witness was asked the following questions: "What
did Justice A tell you that Justice B said to him during or after the court conference in
which the case was discussed?" "What was the law clerk's demeanor when you asked
him ifhis judge's opinion was politically motivated?" Questions by Commission mem
bers such as these were not uncommon.
10. In mid-June of 1978, I informed the Commission counsel that, if required to
testify in public, I would challenge the constitutionality of the public hearing by filing
a petition in the superior court. See Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 500-01,
601 P.2d 1030, 1048, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 512 (1979) (en bane).
11. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494
(1979) (en bane).
12. The Courts of Appeal for the Second Appellate District granted my peti
tion for a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to vacate its denial and to
quash the Commission's subpoena directed at me. Before the' court's decision be
came final, the Commission petitioned the California Supreme Court for relief. All
the supreme court justices, except Associate Justice Newman, disqualified them
selves from the case. Therefore, the Chief Justice assigned six courts of appeal jus
tices, selected by lot, to act on the petition. See Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d
474,480,601 P.2d 1030, 1034, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (1979) (en bane).
13. See note 7 supra.
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before the Commission on Judicial Performance, and I was not
constitutionally required to testify at a public hearing before the
Commission. 14 Commission hearings that had taken nearly five lei
surely weeks in front of television cameras were thereupon con
cluded hastily in. three days in private. The sport, the exhilaration
of the hunt, the play-acting on center stage had been terminated.
The Commission ultimately issued a terse report declaring that
there was no basis to proceed against any supreme court justice. 15
The hearings conducted by the Commission cost the taxpayers
more than a half million dollars, including $400,000 for the private
counsel it hired. 16 I cannot question the expenditure of taxpayers'
dollars for a reasonable investigation based on sound procedures.
In this case, however, the Commission wasted both time and
money by failing to exercise restraint before conducting proceed
ings. I would like to stress that the Commission's counsel took
statements from every justice, and from countless law clerks and
other persons, before undertaking its proceedings. Instead of evalu
ating this evidence to determine whether there was some reason
able basis to proceed, the Commission deemed itself compelled to
plow the same investigative ground in public. The information the
Commission members had before they donned their makeup for
television performances was that there was no basis for charges
against any member of the court. A half million dollars and a half
year later they reached the same conclusion. What began with a
loud media bang ended with an anticlimactic whimper.
There were both winners and losers in this profligate venture.
The Commission members won. They received personal recogni
tion and adulation from professional court detractors. Some mem
bers of the Commission counsel staff won. One assistant is now
running for Congress on the strength of the attention he received.
Finally, the newspaper, television, and radio media won. They re
ceived daily gossip stories with which to titillate their readers and
listeners. The Supreme Court of California, despite the Commis
sian's findings, was the big loser. A prestigious tribunal was now to
be judged by the public on the basis of personality rather than ju
14. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474, 499, 601 P.2d 1030, 1048, 159
Cal. Rptr. 494, 512 (1979) (en bane).
15. CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION, REpORT OF COMMISSION ON
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (Nov. 5, 1979).
16. I also employed private counsel for my litigation against the Commission, but
my lawyers and their prestigious law firm contributed their extensive and successful
legal work as pro bono service.
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dicial product. And the public lost. When respect for the only
peaceable dispute-resolving agency, the court system, is destroyed,
our democratic processes as a whole are in jeopardy. 17
The experience in California demonstrates clearly that once
administrative agencies or any nonjudicial bodies are permitted to
inquire into internal functions of the judiciary, absent articulable
charges of corruption, the independence of the judiciary and its
ability to function efficiently are gravely threatened. There is no
more pathetic sight than learned judges cringing in fear of an ag
gressive investigative commission the members of which are pan
dering to the media.
California has often been an innovator in judicial reform and
administration over the years. 18 The recent inquiry was also inno
vative, but it should be a warning to the bench and bar throughout
the country. Judges cannot invite nonjudicial agencies to investi
gate the courts and still retain the freedom of conscience, inde
pendence, and courage implicit in the decisionmaking process.
Some commentators postulate that judicial independence is an out
moded concept. Professor Raoul Berger, for example, suggests that
it has become a fetish. 19 Others counter with the word "account
ability."20 In my opinion, there is ample accountability to the pub
lic for state judges who are corrupt, intemperate, or senile in the
form of rejection by the electorate. If no election is impending,
there are other responsible methods of proceeding, such as im
peachment, proper inquiries by duly constituted commissions,21
and ~ecommendations to the state's highest court for discipline.
The sanctions may take various forms including private censure,
public censure, suspension, or removal.
Public hearings into internal court matters, however, create
the potential for incalculable mischief. For example, a trial judge

17. See Tribe, supra note 4, at 1179. See generally Kaufman, Chilling Judicial
Independence, 88 YALE L. J. 681 (1979). Contra, Berger, "Chilling Judicial Inde
pendence": A Scarecrow, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1979); See also Berger, Impeach
ment ofJudges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L. J. 1475 (1970).
18. Tribe, supra note 4, at 1176.
19. Berger, supra note 17, at 850. Professor Berger argues that "It is precisely
this unremitting and unauthorized expansion of judicial governance that counsels us
to reject the claim to 'absolute' independence. For uncircumscribed power is alien to
our democratic system." Id.
20. See, e.g., Berkson & Tesitor, Holding Federal Judges Accountable, 61 JUDI
CATURE 442 (1978); Greenburg, supra note 3, at 1496.
21. See note 26 infra.
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who grants probation to a convicted defendant, upon what the
judge believes are adequate grounds, may find himself the victim
of an attack by media commentators. If this results in the judge's be
ing subject to a public inquiry into his beliefs, thought processes,
discussions with staff, and conduct in similar cases, he may be
induced in other cases to temper his judgment in the interest of
avoiding public humiliation. The threat of people saying "he's soft
on crime" could affect not only the timid or sensitive judge, but
even a normally forthright judge.
Judicial independence suffers from that Damoclean sword.
This is particularly so today when media commentators wield such
extraordinary power. One who is irresponsible can, by a single
thoughtless insinuation, reach millions of persons and instantly de
stroy, in the name of accountability, the career of a jurist who has
devoted his lifetime to the law.
A logical question would be whether there has been any indi
cation of an effect of the investigation upon judicial independence.
I cannot breach the confidences of our court conferences, nor can I
probe into the subjective fears of my colleagues. But in the scant
few months since the Commission proceedings began, there have
been some objective manifestations of judicial timidity. Fewer sig
nificant petitions for hearing have been granted, a drop of approxi
mately thirty percent from 1978 to 1979. 22 And some justices are
now more likely to disqualifY themselves from sensitive cases on
the most flimsy of purported ethical bases, rather than to face
forthrightly the decisionmaking responsibility. 23
In view of the post-Watergate syndrome, it is logical to ques
tion whether all hearings should be open or whether secrecy is per
se suspicious. State lawmakers, by their actions, have appeared to
give a negative answer. Washington has become the fiftieth state to
create a judicial conduct commission. 24 Nevertheless, each state
22. The supreme court granted 273 petitions during the 1977-78 term. JUDI
CIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1979 JUDICIAL COUNCIL
REPORT. Only 193 petitions were granted during the 1978-79 term. JUDICIAL COUN
CIL OF CALIFORNIA, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1980 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT.
23. The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct's liberal standard for disqualification per
mits a judge to decline cases when "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
. . ." ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § 3(A) (1) (1976) (emphasis added).
24. the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico also have judicial conduct com
missions. Most jurisdictions provide for confidentiality, at least until formal charges
are preferred against a judge. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 51-51k, 511 (West
Cum. Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 211c §§ 1,2 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).

See generally Conduct Commissions: The Process of Preserving Confidence in the Ju
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provides for the confidentiality of proceedings, at least until formal
charges are preferred against a judge.
The rationale for this respect for confidentiality was articulated
by the ad hoc court25 which heard my lawsuit in Mosk v. Superior
Court. 26 The court declared:
The confidentiality of investigations and hearings by the Com
mission is based on sound public policy. Confidentiality encour
ages the filing of complaints and the willing participation of
citizens and witnesses by providing protection against possible
retaliation or recrimination . . . . Confidentiality protects judges
from injury which might result from publication of unexamined
and unwarranted complaints by disgruntled litigants or their at
torneys ... , or by political adversaries. Confidentiality of inves
tigations by the Commission preserves confidence in the judici
ary as an institution by avoiding premature announcement of
groundless claims of judicial misconduct or disability. . . .
Confidentiality of proceedings before the Commission is essential
to protecting the judge's constitutional right to a private admo
nishment . . . , if the circumstances so warrant. When removal
or retirement is justified by the charges, judges are more likely
to resign or retire voluntarily without the necessity of a formal
proceeding if the publicity that would· accompany such a pro
ceeding can thereby be avoided. 27

The United States Supreme Court has reached the same conclu
sions. 28
diciary, 63 JUDICATURE 204-50 (1979); Note, State Judiciary Disciplinary Commis
sions and Proceedings: Developing Administrative and Legal Standards for
Evaluating Judicial Misconduct, 10 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 685 (1979); Comment, The
Procedures ofJudicial DiSCipline, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 190 (1976). For extensive analysis
of judicial conduct commissions in Illinois, New Jersey, New York, and California, see
Braithwaite, Judicial Misconduct and How Four States Deal With It, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROS. 151 (1970).
25. See note 12 supra.
26. 25 Cal. 3d 474, 601 P.2d 1030, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979) (en bane).
27. ld. at 491, 601 P.2d at 1041-42, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 505-06 (citations omitted).
28. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 898 (1978). Un
ease in this area is not limited to state courts. The federal Judicial Conduct and Dis
ability Act of 1979, S. 1873 [added to S. 1477], 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONGo REC.
S15,435 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1979), has passed the Senate and is now awaiting House ap
proval. The merit of the proposal is that it places responsibility for resolution of inter
nal judicial problems with the 11 judicial councils. Sanctions short of dismissal are
authorized, with impeachment the only vehicle for removal. The Act also urges "in
formal, collegial resolution" of disability and disciplinary matters. For a favorable in
depth analysis of the proposed legislation, see Kaufman, supra note 17. Contra
Berger, supra note 17.
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I mentioned at the outset that California courts are likely to
return to page one. The reason is that organized conservative court
probers tasted blood last year, and they are poised for the kill this
time out. This is not outrageous hyperbole. A group known as the
Law and Order Campaign Committee,29 financed largely by gun
lobby money, is organized in metropolitan areas for the purpose of
rating judges on their performances. Included are such inquiries as
how judges stand on the death penalty or how many defendants
they sentence to prison. The Committee will support campaign op
ponents for those judges whose replies to these and similar ques
tions are not deemed satisfactory. In addition, the group is spon
soring legislation to compel an indexing of judges' criminal sen
tencing. Thus, they advocate a box score on at-bats, hits, and er
rors, as if the fate of human beings can be equated with a pitcher's
curves and sliders. Qualities of a good judge such as impartiality,
intelligence, independence, and integrity to do what the law re
quires regardless of personal consequences are to be disregarded.
The new standard by which judges are to be measured is how of
ten they reach certain results rather than how objectively they dis
pense justice based on individual facts.
On a state-wide basis, the Law and Order Committee is circu
lating an initiative measure to abolish our long-standing Missouri
plan30 of retaining or rejecting appellate court justices on a yes-no
vote, a program which has been widely accepted as enhancing the
quality and independence of the higher courts,31 and to substitute
therefor the typical anachronistic political method of having candi
date opposition for every justice on shortened terms. The executive
director of the so-called Law and Order group has explained its po
sition with a rare economy of words: "All we are asking for is a re
sponsible and accountable judiciary." Translated from the general
to the specific, this means that conservatives want judges who
agree with them.
Referring to the state supreme court justices, the group's di
29. The Law and Order Campaign Committee produced two dramatic and possi
bly unfair television commercials on rape and busing issues designed to discredit
Chief Justice Bird. Most stations, however, refused to air these commercials. See
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1978, at 53.
30. CAL. CaNST. art. VI, § 26. See Smith, The California Method of Selecting
Judges, 3 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1951).
31. See R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR

(1969). Contra, Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial
Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509 (1978).
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rector said, "They have become isolated in their power. They are
accountable to virtually no one for their acts. They can make deci
sions in secrecy and enforce them." This view raises some interest
ing and disturbing questions. To whom should the justices be ac
countable? To the media? To the governor? To the Law and Order
Committee? Should their deliberations, unlike those of a jury, not
be secret? Should their decisions not be enforced? Should the jus
tices be put in a position in which they are forced to keep an eye
on the popular opinion of the moment? Are we ready for Soviet
like people's tribunals?
I hope the answer to that last query is in the negative, that we
do not want judges or justices, at any level of the judiciary, de
pendent upon political fortunes and therefore prisoners of the pub
lic whim. 32 It is tantalizing rhetoric when simplistic commentators
insist that judges, like legislators and executives, should be respon
sive to the public will. I suggest to you that their roles are not
comparable. While legislators and executives are chosen to repre
sent and further the public consensus, judges must have the forti
tude to stand against public opinion when necessary to achieve
justice under the Constitution. 33
In the Federalist Papers,34 Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison expressed their belief that the judiciary, unlike the execu
tive and the legislative branches, should be above the fray, imper
vious to the shifting political winds. There have been attempts to
disregard these words. Franklin Roosevelt railed against the con
servative "Nine Old Men" and proposed to pack the Supreme
Court. He failed. The John Birch Society railed against the liberal
32.

Professor Tribe explains:
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the pending inquiry, far from be
ing a reasoned response to real evidence of abuse, would never have been in
itiated if the anticipated ruling in Tanner had been a popular one-if the
court had been suspected of procedural misconduct but not of nullifying a
widely approved law-and-order measure. The ongoing investigation is thus
punishment for an unpopular result-Gallup Poll justice at its worst.
Tribe, supra note 4, at 1178.
33. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951), provides additional support. He states:
Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good re
flex of a democratic society. . . . Their essential quality is detachment,
founded on independence. History teaches that the independence of the judi
ciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day
and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political,
economic, and social pressures.
[d. at 525 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
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Warren Court and called for impeachment of Earl Warren. It
failed. I wish I could be certain that the current efforts to demean
the judiciary also would fail. There was an old saying that the gods
take care of children, drunkS', and the supreme court. I regret that
in this age of cynicism about all government I am no longer confi
dent of that protection, nor am I sanguine about the future.

